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HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE STRUCTURE OF SECURITY
FORCES IN CONSTITUTIONAL ORDERS:
THE CASE OF ETHIOPIA*
James C.N. Paul**
I. INTRODUCTION
The main part of this contribution consists of a Working Paper that I
presented to the Constitutional Commission of the Transitional Govern-
ment of Ethiopia (TGE)' in Addis Ababa in August 1993. That paper had
its origins in two projects organized by the International Third World
Legal Studies Association. The first was a series of international seminars
held in Africa and elsewhere during 1987-1989 on problems confronting
the development of democratic constitutional orders. A recurrent question
raised in many of these seminars was whether it is possible to create
© 1994 by James C.N. Paul.
William J. Brennan Professor of Law, Rutgers University School of Law in Newark;
Trustee and Secretary, International Center for Law in Development, New York.
The author served as founding Dean of the Law School of the University of Addis
Ababa, then known as Haile Selassie First University, from 1962-1967; as Academic Vice
President of that University from 1967-1969; and as an occasional consultant to its
president from 1972-1974. Since the liberation of Ethiopia from the military dictatorship
of Mengistu Haile Meriam, he has returned to Ethiopia on a number of occasions at the
invitation of the Constitutional Commission of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia.
The Commission is charged with the task of preparing a draft constitution, which will be
reviewed and, presumably, ratified, as amended, by a popularly elected Constitutional
Assembly later in 1994.
I am deeply grateful for the comments of Charles Smith, General Counsel of the
United States Institute for Peace, Washington, D.C.; for the splendid work of Elizabeth
Marshall and Lori Weiner, former students of the Rutgers University Law School in
Newark, in preparing drafts of the Code of Universal Principles and accompanying
commentary and annotations; and for the much-valued assistance of Michael K. Nolan,
presently a law student at Rutgers School of Law, in both the research for and the
preparation of this article. I am also very grateful for support received from the United
States Institute for Peace, Washington, D.C., the Carter Center, Atlanta, Georgia, and the
USAID Mission in Addis Ababa, enabling an ongoing study of the transition in Ethiopia.
The TGE was legally established by the Transitional Period Charter of Ethiopia,
which is, in effect, the interim constitution of a government created to "lead the country
towards full democracy." Transitional Period Charter of Ethiopia, Proclamation No. I,
NEGARIT GAZETA pt. 4; pmbl., July 22, 1991 (Eth.) [hereinafter Charter].
2 See James C.N. Paul, Developing Constitutional Orders in Sub-Saharan Africa: An
Unofficial Report, 1988 THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUD. 1.
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stricter controls over the security forces and make them more accountable.3
This subject led to a second project reported in Third World Legal Studies
1990: Police, Security Forces and Human Rights in the Third World.4 The
proposed Code of Universal Principles, reproduced here, was first prepared
for that project.5
Invited to discuss this subject in Ethiopia, I suggested to the
Commission that it might well pay a good deal of attention to the laws
governing the structure of the security forces 6 in Ethiopia's future
constitutional order.7 The term "security forces" is intended to include
the army, which has played-and probably will play-a major role in
maintaining public order, as well as the police and other organizations
created *to enforce the laws and maintain internal security.8
The Constitutional Commission of Ethiopia is explicitly charged with
the task of producing a draft constitution to establish democracy and
See id. at 27.
4 For a general background on this second project, see Abduluhi Ahmed An-Na'im,
Coordinator's Introduction, 1990 THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUD. 1.
James C.N. Paul, Putting Internal Security Forces Under the Rule of Human Rights
Law: The Need for a Code of Universal Principles Regulating Their Governance, 1990
THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUD. 233.
6 By "laws governing the structure of the security forces," I mean the aggregate of
laws, often found in diverse bodies of legislation and administrative regulations, that
create, organize, and empower the security forces; set out-or more often, fail to set
out-standards governing the recruitment, training, and discipline of their personnel; and
provide-or more often, fail to provide-for the transparency and accountability of these
organs of government.
' By "constitutional order," I mean not only the formal constitution, but that body
of law establishing institutions and processes necessary to implement, promote, and
protect the principles of the constitution and the rights guaranteed by it.
8 The term "internal security forces" as used here covers a wide spectrum of quite
different organizations with different functions, including various kinds of police, prison
officials, internal intelligence-gathering agencies (usually found within the Ministry of
Interior), and various kinds of military units (usually found within a Ministry of Defense).
Draft Code of Universal Principles to Govern the Structure and Accountability of Internal
Security Forces Operating in All States art. 1(b) [hereinafter Draft Code] (appended). In
Ethiopia and in much of Africa, the military is now, and long has been, used to quell
serious internal disturbances. Thus, these forces have been concerned with internal
policing and governance as well as external security; they have exercised powers of arrest,
detention, interrogation, use of deadly force, and other law enforcement powers that affect
basic human rights. Uncontrolled, they constitute a serious threat to civil government and
civil society. While the specialized tasks of each of these units means that differing
regimes of rules must be used to organize each unit, all forces should be organized and
governed by a body of common principles. See Draft Code, supra, art. 1.
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human rights and a rule of law to secure these conditions.9 This general
mandate has been underscored and given added content by Ethiopia's
ratification, without reservations, of the International Bill of Human
Rights' o as well as most other major human rights instruments, including
the United Nations Women s Convention.l" Certainly, these goals are
professed by all political factions now operating within and without
Ethiopia, and probably also by the majority of Ethiopians, most of whom
live in the countryside and derive their livelihood from agriculture.
9 Article one of the Transitional Period Charter incorporates the United Nations
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., pt. 1,
at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration], and particularly
guarantees rights of "freedom of ... expression, association and assembly," Charter,
supra note 1, art. 1(a), and the "right to engage in unrestricted political activity." Id.
art. 1(b). Proclamation No. 24 of 1992 established the Constitutional Commission with
the "mission ... to draft, in conformity with the spirit of the Charter, a constitution in
Accordance [sic] with which the new democratic Ethiopia shall be established and
administered. ... " A Proclamation to Provide for the Establishment of the
Constitutional Commission, Proclamation No. 24/1992, NEGARIT GAZETA art. 4, Aug. 18,
1992 (Eth.) [hereinafter Proclamation No. 24]. These goals were eloquently emphasized
and discussed by Meles Zenawi, President of the TGE, in his Address at the Inter-
Africa Groups Symposium on the Making of the New Ethiopian Constitution (May 17,
1993).
'0 The International Bill of Human Rights consists of the Universal Declaration, supra
note 9; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res.
2200A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) [hereafter
ICESCR]; and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A,
U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) [hereafter
ICCPR].
" Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, G.A.
Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 194, U.N. Doc. A/34/180 (1979)
[hereinafter Women 's Convention]. Ethiopia ratified this treaty in 1980. In late 1993 the
Council of Representatives of the TGE ratified the ICESCR and the ICCPR, supra note
10; the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, G.A. Res 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51
(1984); and the Convention on the Prevention of the Crime of Genocide, G.A. Res. 260A,
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., pt. 1, at 174, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). Ethiopia has long been a
party to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and it has now ratified Protocol II of the
Geneva Conventions. Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12,
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts,
Dec. 7, 1978, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609. Information on these recent ratifications comes from
the Constitutional Commission, which held a public seminar that I attended as a
discussant, in December 1993 to discuss the incorporation of these and other international
instruments into the future constitutional order.
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II. THE MILITARY IN ETHIOPIAN HISTORY
The "Derg,"' 2 the military dictatorship that preceded the TGE,
inflicted in the name of revolutionary, Marxist-Leninist socialism terrible
harms upon most sectors of the population during its seventeen years of
despotic rule. Its demise seems to have marked the end of the system of
centralized, authoritarian rule that characterized the political development
of the Ethiopian state during this century. There are now widespread
popular demands for recognition and redress of regional, ethnic, and other
historic grievances accumulated over many decades as well as for the
decentralization of governance. 3 Free political space has been created, and
talk about democracy and rights is widespread.
12
This Amharic word, sometimes rendered as "Dergue" in English, signifies a
committee or council with powers to coordinate and control the activities of others. The
original 1974 Derg was composed of over 100 members drawn from the military and the
police, both commissioned and noncommissioned officers. Mengistu Haile Meriam, then
a Lieutenant Colonel, emerged as Chairman after providing for the execution, sometimes
personally, of his rivals for power. The power of the Derg gradually waned as Mengistu
assumed full direction of the Government, but the term was used to describe his regime.
See ANDARGACHEW TIRUNEH, THE ETHIOPIAN REVOLUTION, 1974-1987 (1993), for a
detailed history.
" Much of the resistance within Ethiopia to the rule of the Derg was organized
regionally among those ethnic groups that predominantly populated particular regions.
Among the more significant of these "liberation fronts" were the Eritrean Peoples
Liberation Front (EPLF), which predated the Derg but grew in strength and commitment
to total independence for Eritrea, a result of Mengistu Haile Meriam's very aggressive and
repressive policies in attempting to suppress the Eritrean movement; the Tigray Peoples'
Liberation Front (TPLF), which became an increasingly effective military and political
force in the north and which, in the late 1980s, converted itself into the Ethiopian Peoples
Democratic Revolutionary Front (EPDRF) in an attempt to establish a broader ethnic and
political base; and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), which first organized in the western
and southwestern regions and which claimed to be the party of all the Oromo peoples of
Ethiopia-approximately 40% of Ethiopia's population-dispersed widely in central and
southern Ethiopia. The growing strength of these and other ethnic-regional political groups
probably drew on historic grievances against the traditional system of centralized,
authoritarian rule as well as the repressive agrarian policies of the Derg, including its
attempts to "collectivize" farming and its forced "villigization" projects, which often
wrought terrible hardships on peasant families. ALEMENEH DEJUNE, ENVIRONMENT,
FAMINE AND POLITICS IN ETHIOPIA: A VIEW FROM THE VILLAGE (1990). For accounts of
this period of civil warfare and its roots in past rebellions see AFRICA WATCH, EVIL
DAYS: 30 YEARS OF WAR AND FAMINE IN ETHIOPIA (1991) (painstaking survey of the
history of the Derg prepared by Alex de Waal, former Associate Director of Africa
Watch); PAUL HENZE, REBELS AND SEPARATISTS IN ETHIOPIA: REGIONAL RESISTANCE TO
A MARXIST REGIME (1985) (report prepared for the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy); GEBRA TAREK, ETHIOPIA: POWER AND PROTEST-PEASANT REVOLTS
IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1991).
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Yet, the prospects for realizing the promised transition may be fraught
with difficulties. In many respects, the institutions and practice of
democratic methods of governance are new to Ethiopian political
experience. Military force has long been a significant theme in politics and
political culture. In earlier times, traditional political elites were often men
who were known for their military prowess. In later times, many of the
nobility titles bestowed by the Emperor Haile Selassie still connoted high
military rank, perhaps as a reflection of the military traditions in politics.
Greater Ethiopia, the Empire created in the late nineteenth century,
brought many different ethnic groups into an expanded imperial state.
Some of the peoples in the southern half of the country were forcibly
incorporated, creating historical legacies which now must be recognized
and redressed. Personal and centralized rule, hierarchical and authoritarian
methods of administration, secrecy, and an absence of participation have
long characterized governance. Although Haile Selassie gradually
modernized and professionalized the Government, in many respects his
bureaucracy, and certainly his local governors, reflected a patrimonial
system. Similarly, while the Emperor created important institutional
foundations for developing a democratic system and the rule of law-an
elected Chamber of Deputies and a nominally independent judiciary-these
organs remained under his watchful eye. There were no parties. The
nongovernmental press, such as it was, and parliamentary elections were
closely controlled. Judges were appointed, transferred, or retired by
imperial command. Rights of association were constrained; civil society, 4
while vibrant in many ways, was weak in terms of its capacity to nurture
democracy. 5 The military forces, on the other hand, increased not only in
size, but in professional status and potential political power. That power
was illustrated when the Derg seized control in 1974 and proceeded to
demonstrate the dangers of military rule. Whereas the autocratic rule of the
14 By "civil society" I refer particularly to organized social, economic, and political
activities carried on independent of government and largely free from legal control, such
as professional, civic, and political associations; cooperatives and workers' organizations;
the independent press; and other groups concerned with public affairs. The Ethiopian
Church was allied with the Regime at the upper levels of the hierarchy, but perhaps less
so at grassroots levels.
'5 A recent valuable one-volume history of the making of the modem Ethiopian state
is BAHRU ZEWDE, A HISTORY OF MODERN ETHIOPIA 1855-1974 (1991). Regarding Haile
Selassie's regime, see CHRISTOPHER CLAPHAM, HAILE SELASSIE'S GOVERNMENT (1969)
and JOHN MARKAKIS, ETHIOPIA: ANATOMY OF A TRADITIONAL POLITY (1974), both of
which contain interesting analyses of the military, the police, and styles of governance.
On the constitutional history of the Emperor's long years, see ETHIOPIAN
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT (James C.N. Paul & Christopher Clapham eds., 1967 &
1971) (2 volumes).
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imperial regime was relatively benign, the Derg ruled in a lawless, brutal,
totalitarian way. The internal security system created by the Derg and
perfected by its ultimate leader, the dictator Mengistu Haile Meriam,
dominated all organs of government and civil society. Mengistu's regime
was finally destroyed after a long civil war. The leaders of the victorious
liberation forces orchestrated the creation of the TGE, a government whose
legitimacy derives from its military supremacy, even as it seeks to become
a surrogate for a participatory, democratic transition.
III. THE TASK OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL, COMMISSION
In light of this historical and social context, the tasks now confronting
the peoples of Ethiopia, the TGE, and the Constitutional Commission-as
well as the new government to be elected at some point in 1994-are
formidable.' 6 The challenges are made more difficult because the
legitimacy of the TGE has been under attack from its beginning, but
especially after the flawed regional and local elections held in June 1992.' 7
16 Not discussed above, but clearly a part of the context for the transition-and a source
of constraints-is the nature of the Ethiopian economy and the social structure built upon
it. Ethiopia is an agricultural country; the majority of its people live in self-provisioning
peasant households, and this rural population is growing at an alarming rate. According
to Samuel Huntington, successful transitions to democracy are most likely to occur if
countries become urbanized in demographic terms: as the economy grows, diversifies, and
becomes more complex; as the private industrial and commercial sector becomes
independent from the state; and as a strong middle class emerges. SAMUEL P.
HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY
(1991). Ethiopia, with a per capita GNP of less than $150, lacks this kind of economic
base and social structure. In a report to the USAID Mission in Addis Ababa, Huntington
noted the absence of these conditions and the presence of other factors, e.g., ethnic
divisions, lack of democratic traditions and experiences, and a weak civil society. He
opined that the prospects for the transition depended on developing a "peasant-based"
democracy, a model which might be built on a base of an independent, self-reliant,
essentially land-owning peasantry, and on the commitment and power of a dominant
political party that would establish links with the peasantry and the diverse ethnic groups
at grassroots levels. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Development in Ethiopia: A Peasant-
Based Dominant Party Democracy?, Report to USAID/Ethiopia and Consultations with
the Constitutional Commission 28 March - 1 April, 1993 (May 17, 1993) (unpublished
report). Huntington did not explore the constitutional implications of this approach, nor
did he address some closely related and controversial issues now prominent on the
Commission's agenda, such as the development of a system of ethnic federalism.
7 The period from 1974 to the present may, in retrospect, come to be seen as one of
continuing revolution. The relatively peaceful political upheavals that began in 1974 led
to a short period of unprecedented political freedom and a commitment to democratic
constitutional reforms by the imperial regime. This period ended with the Derg's
intervention, followed by its attempt to impose a Communist system, and its brutal
repression-or attempted repression-of opposing persons and groups. The Derg's
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Also, the TGE is confronted with a number of pressing economic and
social conditions, many of which are legacies of the prior regime. Efforts
to address these problems and restructure the economy may impact harshly
on some sectors of the population.'8
despotism in turn fueled regional rebellions, ethnic consciousness, and a bloody period of
civil warfare culminating in the EPDRF's military victories and consolidation of its
political power.
The TGE's legitimacy rests upon several factors: the EPDRF army's destruction of the
Derg's and its emergence as the dominant force in May 1993 following its liberation of
Addis Ababa; the prompt recognition and support of this government by the United States
and other western powers; its orchestration of the Transitional Period Conference; and the
adoption of the Transition Charter in July 1991. From the beginning of the transitional
process, however, there was opposition to the TGE. The OLF, at first a junior partner in
the new government, broke with the TGE over the conduct of the 1992 regional and local
government elections, which were seriously flawed and were swept by the EPDRF and
its surrogate local parties. Theodor Dagne, Ethiopia: The Struggle for Unity and
Democracy, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT (June 20, 1992). For a critique
of the EPDRF's rise to power, see Alemante G. Selassie, Ethiopia: Problems and
Prospects for Democracy, 1 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 205 (1992).
Opposition to the TGE derives from various sources-mistrust of its ethnic base, its
leadership, the erstwhile extreme and simplistic Marxist ideology of the TPLF during the
civil war era, its apparent commitment to "ethnic federalism," its occasionally heavy-
handed policies against political opponents, its manipulation of the court system, and its
sometimes serious abuses of human rights. Id. Recently, a coalition of opposition groups
met in Addis Ababa at the National Conference for Peace and Reconciliation in Ethiopia,
which was carried on behind closed doors, and established a Council of Alternative Forces
on Peace and Democracy to work, peaceably, for the establishment of a new transitional
government. Seven members of the Conference were placed under detention, illegally it
would seem, by the TGE. Jennifer Parmelee, Ethiopian Opposition: Rulers Stay Too Long,
WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 1993, at A16. A subsequent Washington Post editorial called for
the release of those kept in custody and warned against the trend toward "politics
controlled by the government," a process enhanced by lawless security organizations that
have practiced illegal detention with increasing frequency. Free the Ethiopian Five,
WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 1994, at A26. Despite the above observations, there is
unprecedented political freedom in Addis Ababa, and it seems likely that the TGE enjoys
a wide base of popular support in many parts of the country, which may be attributable
to the organizational capacities of the EPDRF. Quite obviously, however, the present
situation underscores the need to put the security forces under a rigorous rule of law
grounded in respect for the principles of democratic constitutionalism and human rights.
18 One problem to be addressed is the privatization or reform of the enormous number
of inefficient or inoperative state enterprises created by the last regime, including
"retrenchment" of labor forces, rehabilitation of many seriously degraded rural areas,
devaluation of the currency, and the development of a land law system that will provide
security of tenure to peasants in possession and prevent fragmentations. See, e.g.,
Transitional Government of Ethiopia, Ethiopia s Economic Policy in the Transitional
Period (Nov. 1991).
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The Constitutional Commission, as a first phase of its work, focused
very broadly on identifying basic difficulties and issues confronting the
promised transition.' 9 The importance of the process to be followed in
attempting to construct a draft constitution-the need to generate
widespread public discussions on shared concerns and strategies to address
them-was emphasized. 20 The Commission held a number of public
sessions, often covered by the media, featuring discussions on a wide
variety of subjects.2' In public seminars held by the Commission that I
have attended, certain general themes have recurred regularly, notably
discussions of four interrelated tasks:22
1. How to build a civil society and civic culture that value, and become
increasingly capable of maintaining, a democratic system of governance;
2. How to decentralize and devolve powers of government in a
multi-ethnic polity where both needs and demands for powers of local
self-administration seem urgent;
3. How to address the grievances and claims of ethnic and religious
groups for greater political recognition and local autonomy and for
recognition of their rights to maintain their language, culture, and customs,
including control over their historic lands;
4. How to develop governmental institutions and processes that will
promote democratic governance and protect human rights, including
institutions and processes that will promote and secure the integrity of
electoral processes.
The law establishing the Commission, see Proclamation No. 24, supra note 9,
empowered it to organize and conduct "public discussions," and "symposia" on
constitutional principles. Id. art. 5(2).
20 In one session that I attended in 1992, the principal topic was "Whose Constitution
Is It To Be?" This theme was emphasized by President Meles in his address to the
InterAfrica Symposium. Meles, supra note 9.
21 Recently, the Commission prepared a number of questions to be submitted'to local
meetings to be held all over the country. These meetings were designed to pose various
basic choices reflecting possible "models" to be followed in drafting a constitution,
including whether to have an elected president and presidential system or a constitutional
monarchy, and what form decentralization would take.
22 The issues noted below also emerged as subjects of basic significance in the six
international seminars organized by the International Third World Legal Studies
Association on Building Constitutional Orders in Sub-Saharan Africa. See Paul, supra
note 2.
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It should be obvious that these tasks are quite interrelated. It also
seems that in the Ethiopian context and perhaps elsewhere in Africa, the
difficulties of building institutions often are glossed over. Discussions
sometimes simply assume that parliamentary systems, independent courts,
responsible political parties, and other institutions can spring from seeds
sown by a liberal constitution. For example, there is wide agreement in
Ethiopia that the courts must be made independent and somehow
adequately empowered to protect rights and enforce a "rule of law." The
difficulties, however, of spelling out, let alone promoting, this objective are
not always appreciated.23 Moreover, the constitutional role and powers of
the courts are inevitably dependent on not only the remedies that courts
can dispense to secure the rule of law, but on the legal structure and
political positions of the police, the military, and other internal security
forces. Indeed, it seems surprising that despite a large body of social
science literature on the unhappy experiences with armies in Africa-there
is much less literature on the police-little attention has been focused on
policies and strategies needed to restructure and reconstitute the security
forces in both legal and social terms for the purpose of transforming them
into institutions that will support a democratic constitutional order and a
respect for rights and the rule of law.24 Ethiopian experience certainly
seems to underscore this observation.
As noted above, the military looms large in Ethiopian history, not only
as a preeminent source of the historic system of "personal rule," but as
an instrument of law enforcement. Even today the TGE's army necessarily
performs many policing functions since the Derg's police and security
13 These problems were developed in a draft report prepared by the International
Human Rights Law Group (Washington) for USAID, Addis Ababa. The report contains
much factual information of value in depicting problems of organization, recruitment,
training, security, etc. of an independent judiciary and many other related matters. See
International Human Rights Law Group, Ethiopia in Transition (1994).
During December 1993, I was asked by the Chief Justice of the Ethiopian Supreme
Court to speak at several seminars of Supreme and High Court judges. At that time
discussions were held on steps necessary to disengage the courts completely from the
administration and supervision of the Ministry of Justice. Historically, the Ministry has
exercised its "administrative" powers in ways that undermine judicial independence.
Taking away this jurisdiction is a task of major significance, but one that reveals the
complexities of establishing an accessible court system and an effective, competent,
independent judiciary that can also be held accountable to standards of judicial conduct
appropriate to the Ethiopian context.
24 See, however, THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUDIES 1990: POLICE, SECURITY FORCES AND
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE THIRD WORLD for a collection of country studies reflecting some
of the problems; see also Daniel 0. Ntanda Nsereko, The Police, Human Rights and the
Constitution: An African Perspective, 15 HUM. RTS. Q. 465 (1993), for a revealing study
of the legal structure of security forces in East Africa, notably Uganda.
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forces have been totally disbanded, and the army has been forced into the
role of quelling unruly-or allegedly unruly-public disturbances and
restraining regional liberation forces hostile to the Government.25
The experience of the direct military rule of the Derg has left terrible
memories and legacies of brutal, lawless law enforcement. Beyond that,
there is the history of the professional police created by Haile Selassie in
1942 following liberation from the Italian occupation.26 While in some
respects the police forces, which included a sizable paramilitary unit, may
have been well-trained and efficient, their relationships with civil society
were often characterized by patterns of human rights abuse familiar to all
who have studied the pathologies of law enforcement in many Third World
countries. Illegal detentions, coercive integration, mistreatment of prisoners
and indeed sometimes harsh treatment of students and political dissidents,
disdain for the poor and vulnerable, disrespect for the orders of courts-
e.g., in habeas corpus cases-were all often alleged to be common
phenomena, as were instances of petty corruption. It is probably also true
that the training and acculturation of the police simply failed to emphasize
or inculcate much respect for human rights and the rule of law. In various
ways their conduct helped to generate popular mistrust of the legal
system.27
Certainly the security forces of the Derg showed no respect for these
values once the regime openly proclaimed and imposed its brand of
socialism on the country. The Derg organized throughout much of the
country a deliberate use of terror to sustain its rule, a large-scale system
of summary executions, torture, and disappearances. Thousands perished,
and many thousands more suffered physical abuse from this state-
sponsored violence. One major task now confronting the TGE is to bring
25 For accounts of some of the army's policing activities, see Ethiopia: The Status of
Amharas Since May 1991, DEP'T JUST. PROFILE SERIES PR/Eth/93.001 (Jan. 1993)
(summarizing a large number of news reports on many conflicts and civil disorders
involving the army that have occurred in many parts of Ethiopia during the period noted).
26 A Proclamation to Provide for the Organization Discipline Powers and Duties of
the Police Force and for Matters Incidental Thereto, Proclamation No. 6, NEGARIT
GAZETA, Jan. 1, 1942 (Eth.) [hereinafter Proclamation No. 6) (providing for the creation,
organization, duties, etc. of a national police force patterned after the police in British
colonial territories, which put these forces under the control of the Governor General).
British military advisors were prominent in Haile Selassie's government at this time.
27 During my tenure as Dean of the Law School at the University of Addis Ababa, we
organized programs to teach criminal and constitutional law to commissioned police
officgrs. There were also opportunities to discuss the "rule of law" orientation of the
police. For some revealing reported cases on police misconduct, see ETHIOPIAN CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: A SOURCEBOOK (Stanley Z. Fisher ed., 1969).
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some of the major perpetrators of these crimes to justice.28 Another task
is to begin the process, tabula rasa, of creating security forces that can
complement the institutions of democracy and the rule of law.
Experience outside Ethiopia surely underscores this point. Throughout
much of Africa and elsewhere in the Third World, the security forces have
played a destructive role in political and, often, economic development as
instruments of authoritarian rule and despotism; often as perpetrators of
widespread crimes against humanity, as that term is defined in the
Nuremberg Charter; and as vehicles of continuing, systematic patterns of
abuse in routine law enforcement.29 Patterns of policing and maintaining
internal security must surely have a direct impact on the kind of political
order that exists in a country. It is certainly difficult to build a civil
society, political culture, and institutions and processes supportive of
democracy and the value of a humane rule of law when the police and
military are essentially lawless and unaccountable organs of governance.
Autonomous security forces, ungoverned by laws mandating respect and
support for the constitution and strict adherence to a number of other
principles, are, quite obviously, very serious threats to attempted transitions
in many places.
Indeed, in Ethiopia, and surely elsewhere, it seems important to
appreciate that the police and military must play a potentially affirmative
role in helping to develop a transitional rule of law, respect for rights,
democratic practices, and civil society. In Ethiopia there exists today a
possibility of recourse to violence for a prolonged period because many
social tensions exist. Conversely, the security forces have a major role to
play in assuring the integrity of electoral processes. When these processes
are seen to be unfair and marred by coercion and violence, the outcome
may be the subversion of efforts to create democracy. It thus seems quite
important to develop new patterns of policing, new concepts of
"security," and new organs of government to perform these functions in
" On some of these atrocities see, e.g., AFRICA WATCH, supra note 13, at 3-5;
Amnesty International, Ethiopia: End of an Era of Brutal Repression, A New Chance for
Human Rights (June, 1991). During December 1993 I worked with the Office of the
Special Prosecutor charged with bringing to justice officials of the former regime who
perpetrated summary executions, forced disappearances, and torture. The files and
evidence in this office reveal that the Derg planned and organized such activities as part
of a massive system of state terror, and when put in "high gear," these operations took
on a life of their own. Thousands perished.
29 See, e.g., supra note 24. The country reports of organizations such as Amnesty
International and Human Rights Watch provide extensive and sobering evidence of the
scale and intensity of violence used by military and civilian dictatorial regimes to maintain
their authority.
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the context of a liberated society in transition, as well as a new re-
lationship between the security forces and civil society.
The following paper was originally prepared at the invitation of the
InterAfrica Group, an Ethiopian civic association, when it organized a
Symposium on the Making of the New Ethiopian Constitution, held in
Addis Ababa in May 1993. I was invited by the Constitutional
Commission to discuss the paper at a seminar with the Commission in
August 1993. I have edited and annotated it for publication here.
THE SECURITY FORCES IN ETHIOPIA'S FUTURE
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER
The Need to Put Them Under a Rule of Law Derived
From the International Bill of Rights
A Working Paper Prepared for the
Constitutional Commission
August 1993
The TGE has charged the Constitutional Commission with the task of
preparing a constitution that will establish institutions and processes to
institute democratic governance and the protection of universally
recognized human rights. Presumably, the Commission must heed this
mandate closely in the creation of all of the basic organs of government.
Each of these organs must be put under a particular rule of law that will
enable and obligate it to promote and protect human rights and the
principles of a democratic system of governance.
In this context, the military, the police, and other law enforcement
organizations, i.e., the "security forces," must be seen as basic organs of
government, in many ways as important as the executive, the legislature,
and the courts. Thus, it is necessary for the Commission to identify those
principles that should be incorporated into the new constitutional order for
the purpose of putting the security forces under a rule of law designed to
assure their commitment to democracy and human rights. This paper
addresses that task.
Part I sets out principles, derived from the International Bill of Human
Rights and other basic international human rights instruments that Ethiopia
has ratified, which can be used to develop both constitutional provisions
and legislation governing the future security forces of the country, in-
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cluding those of the regional and local governments. An appended
suggested draft code of principles details these ideas. Principles of this
kind should be incorporated into the future constitutional order. Part II
focuses on the importance of this task in view of both the unhappy history
of the role played by the military and the police in the governance of
Ethiopia in the past and the need today to reconstitute them, tabula rasa.
Part III suggests some strategies that the Commission might employ to
address these difficult tasks.
I. DETERMINING THE PRINCIPLES THAT SHOULD GOVERN THE SECURITY
FORCES IN A DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER
The International Bill of Human Rights, to which Ethiopia is now
committed, is more than a charter of basic rights. It is also a significant
source of constitutional principles that helps people everywhere to define
"democracy" as a system of government, to understand the symbiotic
relationships between a democratic system and the realization of
fundamental rights, and to appreciate the need for governmental institutions
committed to the interrelated tasks.
The International Bill of Human Rights calls upon those who create
constitutional orders to establish a "democratic society."30 It calls for the
creation of an elected representative assembly" and for governmental
institutions and processes to provide for the realization of universal
30 The International Bill of Rights assumes the existence of a "democratic society."
See, e.g., Universal Declaration, supra note 9, art. 29(2), which states:
In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such
limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due
recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just
requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic
society.
Id. (emphasis added). For analogous provisions in the Covenants, see ICCPR, supra note
10, arts. 14(1), 21, 22; ICESCR, supra note 10, art. 4; and, more recently, United Nations
World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (June
25, 1993) pt. 1, pmbl.; pt. 2, 5, 15, 21, in 32 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1661 (1993).
3' The Universal Declaration states:
1. Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or
through freely chosen representatives. 2. Everyone has the right to equal access to
public service in his country. 3. The will of the people shall be the basis of the
authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine
elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret
vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.
Universal Declaration, supra note 9, art. 21; see also ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 25;
Women 's Convention, supra note 11, art. 8.
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suffrage and fair and frequent elections.32 It calls for the establishment of
independent courts mandated and adequately empowered to protect human
rights.33 At a deeper level of analysis, the International Bill of Human
Rights and other basic United Nations human rights Conventions that
Ethiopia has ratified prescribe adherence to a body of constitutional
principles, which facilitate democratic governance and which should be
used to structure each organ of government in a way that obligates that
organ to respect democratic practices and human rights when carrying out
its particular functions. These principles also hell) to define a democratic
system irrespective of whether the constitution creates a presidency,
parliamentary, constitutional monarchy, or some other system of govern-
ment. The principles call for institutions of government that will promote
and protect:
1. Respect for the sovereignty of the people, secured, in part, by
establishing the supremacy of a constitution that is derived from the
exercise of rights of political participation 34 and self-determination,35 which
expresses the "will of the people," and which provides for continuing
opportunities to express that will;
36
2. Participation in governance, secured through recognition of a wide
array of political rights including freedoms of association, assembly,
speech, and press; the rights to vote and participate in free electoral
processes; and the right of access to responsible officials in all agencies of
government in order to present grievances, demands, and proposals, or to
seek information;37
32 See supra note 3 1.
13 Universal Declaration, supra note 9, art. 8 ("Everyone has the right to an effective
remedy by the competent national tribunal for acts violating the fundamental rights
granted to him by the constitution or by law."); id. art. 10 ("Everyone is entitled in full
equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the
determination of his fights and obligations and of any criminal charges against him.");
id. art. 11; ICCPR, supra note 10, arts. 2, 6(2), 9, 13, 14, 26; Women s Convention, supra
note 11, arts. 2(c), 15.
" See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
31 ICESCR, supra note 10, art. 1(1), (3); ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 1.
36 See supra note 31 and accompanying text; Universal Declaration, supra note 9, art.
18 ("Everyone has the right of thought, conscience and religion .... "); id. art. 19
("Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression.....); id. art. 20
("Everyone has the freedom of peaceful assembly and association.").
31 Universal Declaration, supra note 9, art. 19. (stating "[t]he right . . . to seek,
receive and impart information"); ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 2.
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3. Representation in governance, secured not only through the popular
exercise of the right of participation, noted above, and the right to a
representative legislative organ,38 but also through respect for the right of
groups to present their views on matters of concern to relevant agencies
of government and to have these fairly heard;3 9 and the rights of women
and persons of different ethnic, cultural, or religious backgrounds to enjoy
equal access to employment in all organs of government and to demand
fair representation in government;
40
4. Equality of opportunity, secured not only through bills of rights and
legislation, but through processes that require each organ of government
to hear claims challenging the legality of its actions or the actions of its
personnel, and through laws that empower courts or other tribunals to
impose adequate remedies when these claims are shown to be valid and
unredressed by the wrongdoing agencies;
41
5. Equality of treatment. to all elements of the population, secured
through respect for the right of all persons to enjoy equal access to
positions of government and through appropriate actions to remove historic
patterns of discrimination practiced against them;
42
38 Universal Declaration, supra note 9, art. 21(3) ("The will of the people shall be
the basis of the authority of government . ). . See supra note 31.
" See supra note 33.
40 Universal Declaration, supra note 9, art. 2 ("Everyone is entitled to all the rights
and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction... such as race, color, sex,
language, [or] religion. . . ."); id. art. 7 ("All are equal before the law and are entitled
without any discrimination to equal protection of the law."); ICESCR, supra note 10, art.
2(2); ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 2(1); Women s Convention, supra note 11, arts. 3, 7, 8.
41 See ICCPR article 1(3), which states:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes: (a) To insure that any person
whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have effective
remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in
an official capacity; (b) To ensure that any person claiming such remedy shall have
his right thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative
authorities, or by any other competent authority....
ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 1(3).
42 See supra note 40 and accompanying text; Women s Convention, supra note 11, art.
2(f) ("[T]ake all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing
laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimination against
women."); id. art. 3 ("State Parties shall take ... in the political, social, economic and
cultural fields, all appropriate measures ... to ensure full development and advancement
of women .. "); see also id. arts. 4-6.
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6. Transparency in the conduct of governance, secured through the
imposition of obligations to conduct lawmaking, adjudicatory, and
regulatory proceedings in public; obligations to make and preserve
prescribed records of official actions and to make these records readily
available to the public; and obligations imposed on designated officials in
all organs of government to meet with the press and public to explain
decisions affecting particular citizens or groups, or the country as a
whole;
43
7. Free, fair, and frequent elections, secured through the rights of
peoples to demand fair enforcement by impartial agencies of government,
including the security forces, of laws designed to assure the peaceful,
democratic character and integrity of all stages of the electoral process;'
8. Imposition of accountability on all officials who violate these
principles, secured through recognition of the rights of people to demand
the disciplining, removal, and imposition of criminal and civil liability on
all offending officials, with appropriate powers and duties vested in the
courts and other departments of government to enforce these sanctions
against offending officials;
45
9. Respect for the constitution and the rule of law as a transcendent
obligation imposed on all officials, secured by requiring solemn commit-
ments from all public officials to support the constitution and to obey the
law as a condition for officeholding,46 and through processes of recruitment
and training, codes of conduct, and other methods that emphasize loyalty
43 See supra note 37, and particularly ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 25(b) ("[G]enuine
periodic elections ... shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of
the will of the electors.").
44 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
41 ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 2(3)(a) ("[E]nsure that any person whose rights or
freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy,
notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official
capacity."); id. art. 2(3)(c) ("[E]nsure that the competent authorities shall enforce such
remedies when granted.").
46 Paragraph three of the Preamble to the Universal Declaration declares that "it is
essential... that human rights[] be protected by the rule of law." Universal Declaration,
supra note 9, pmbl. 3. The ICCPR, article 2(2), imposes the obligation on each state
"to take the necessary steps, in accordance with its constitutional processes ... to adopt
such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights
recognized in the present Covenant." ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 2(2). The obligation to
take steps to ensure protection runs through the ICCPR and is emphasized in the
requirement of article 2(3)(b) of a legal system that provides remedies, see supra note 41,
and "ensure[s] that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies." Id. art. 3(c).
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to these principles above all other loyalties, including loyalties owed to the
regime in power or to one's party, patron, or superior.47
If Ethiopia's human rights commitments are taken seriously, these
principles will be reflected in the new constitutional order, notably in those
bodies of law that establish the fundamental rights of peoples and in the
laws that provide for the establishment, organization, governance, and
accountability of each organ of government.
A key problem confronting the Commission is how to adapt and apply
these prescriptions to the security forces. The first step may be to create
a general framework of principles, which in turn can be used to draft the
following: (i) provisions of the constitution relating to the security forces;
(ii) the basic legislation, to be enacted at a later point, providing for their
establishment, organization, finance, management, and oversight, and for
the required standards of conduct, discipline, transparency, and account-
ability; and (iii) regulations promulgated by the relevant ministries to
implement and adapt these legal commands to the army, police, and other
law enforcement agencies. Viewed in this light, the proposed framework
of principles can be seen as a projection of an important part of Ethiopia's
future constitutional order.
An illustrative Draft Code of Universal Principles (Draft Code), to
supply such a framework, is appended. This Draft Code is not intended as
an idiosyncratic statement of personal preferences. Rather, provisions of
existing international human rights law were the sources of the principles
proposed, demonstrating that the law already calls for the action proposed.
In addition to the International Bill of Human Rights, the Draft Code
draws on the United Nations Conventions on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women 48 and the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.49 Ethiopia has ratified all of these
4' The obligation to develop a civic culture that values and respects universal rights is
often overlooked. Paragraph 8 of the Preamble to the Universal Declaration
"[p]roclaims" the Declaration "as a common standard of achievement . . . to the end
that every . . . organ of society . . . shall strive by teaching and education to promote
respect for these rights." Universal Declaration, supra note 9, pmbl. 8. Further,
"[e]ducation shall be directed to the ... strengthening of respect for human rights." Id.
art. 26(2). See also ICESCR, supra note 10, art. 13(1). "Everyone is entitled to a social
... order in which . . . [his] rights . . . can be fully realized." Universal Declaration,
supra note 9, art. 28. The obligation of the state to ensure respect for universal rights
surely includes an obligation to establish standards of conduct, training, and systems of
accountability directed towards that objective.
48 Women 's Convention, supra note 11.
49 G.A. Res. 2106, U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, at 47, U.N. Doc. A/6014
(1965).
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international instruments. Important parts of the Draft Code are derived
also from other international instruments, adopted unanimously by the
United Nations General Assembly, that set out standards necessary for
humane law enforcement, such as the United Nations Code of Conduct for
Law Enforcement Officers.5 ° These instruments were supported by Ethiopia
in the United Nations, and in view of the Commission's mandate, they
may deserve high visibility in Ethiopia's future constitutional order.
The Draft Code addresses a number of subjects, including the
following:
1) The Fundamental Mission of the Security Forces. The security
forces are created not simply to provide for "law enforcement" in the.
abstract, or law enforcement in blind obedience to the commands of the
government of the day, but law enforcement subject to, and carried on in
accordance with, the commands of the constitutional order. The overriding
obligation of law enforcement is to protect and preserve that constitutional
order.5
2) Legislative Control. The power to establish and abolish, organize,
empower and limit powers, and provide for the financing and maintenance
of all security forces must reside in the elected legislative branch, which
must also enjoy powers of continuing oversight and review over all secur-
ity forces in order to maintain its and the peoples' sovereignty over them.52
3) Judicial Control. The courts must be adequately empowered to hear
and determine all cases alleging abuses of power by the security forces; to
impose civil and criminal remedies on wrongdoers; and, when necessary,
to provide other remedies requiring the correction of systematic abuses by
particular units. These powers of judicial control in no way should
preclude or deter the legislature and the executive from discharging their
obligation to preview and remedy systematic abuses and other faults in the
governance or operation of security forces. Even so, a basic commitment
to the rule of law as the means to secure democracy and rights implies that
the courts or a counterpart independent tribunal must enjoy the power to
protect rights when other organs fail to do soF 3
4) Executive Control. The civilian chief executive, as well as his
ministers and other delegates, should enjoy powers of command over the
50 G.A. Res. 169, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. A/34/169 (1979).
"' See Draft Code, supra note 8, art. 1(a)(2), (3).
52 See id. arts. II, 111(b).
13 See id. arts. 111(c), IX(d).
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security forces, but these powers must be exercised in accordance with the
limitations imposed by the constitution and legislation governing the se-
curity forces and the decisions of the courts interpreting those laws. This
concept of dependent and conditional executive control should replace the
historic practice of exclusive and autonomous executive control in order
to assure vindication of the democratic and human rights principles set out
above.54
5) Codes of Conduct. The legislature should enact a fundamental law
prescribing both the standards of conduct expected of every person in the
various security forces and the processes of enforcing these standards. The
legislation should require the relevant ministries to implement this law by
promulgating detailed codes of conduct for each of the various branches.
One purpose of these codes is to promote the protection of human rights
in law enforcement by imposing strict discipline on those who violate or
condone violations of the code. A second is to use the code as a basic
element in the training and orientation of all ranks and elements, a point
which may be crucial to the reorganization and reorientation of the future
security forces.55
6) Recruitment, Training, and Orientation. These processes, as already
suggested, must reflect commitments to the principles of equality of access
and opportunity and to the duty to protect the constitutional order and to
educate all persons with respect to its commands and the commands of the
relevant codes of conduct.56
7) Transparency. Security forces must be required to keep-and make
available to the public-prescribed records, such as records of arrests,
detentions, and indeed, of all other activities which plainly affect the rights
of the peoples. Designated officials must be available to the public to
answer questions regarding these operations and other matters of public
concern.
57
8) Liability, Criminal and Civil. Liability must be imposed on all ranks
for violations of codes of conduct or any other laws that impose duties
designed to protect the rights and the security of civil society. Defenses
14 See id. art. 111(a) (interpreted in the context of art. IX).
15 See id. arts. IV, V(b).
56 See id. art. V.
17 See id. art. VII.
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such as "obedience to superior orders" or "ignorance of the law" must
be recognized only in regard to mitigation, not liability.
58
9) Empowering Civil Society. The law governing the security forces
should enable the press, non-governmental organizations, and other groups
in civil society to monitor the governance and conduct of the security
forces and to demand accountability for unlawful actions in accordance
with the principles set out above.59
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF THESE PRINCIPLES IN LIGHT OF
THE ETHIOPIAN EXPERIENCE
Cynics or critics may suggest, of course, that all this is aspirational and
academic-that the enactment of these laws cannot effectively change the
ways of armies, police, and unscrupulous political leaders who use force
to gain or maintain power. There are several answers to that charge. The
need for principles is not academic. It is based on the requirements of
international human rights law. It is also based on the lessons of
experience: the history of military rule and past abuse of rights by the
army and police in Ethiopia and many other countries; the fact that steps
must be taken-and some have been initiated-to reorganize Ethiopia's
security forces in fundamental ways as part of the transition; the fact that
this reorganization will provide a unique opportunity not only to reorient,
reeducate, and retrain these forces, but to restructure and reconstitute them
in legal terms; the fact that the security forces have a crucial, positive role
to play in promoting the promised transition; and the fact that this
transition will be flawed and put at risk to the extent that the security
forces are left ungoverned by, and unaccountable to, the principles of a
democratic order and the rule of law.
Military force surely looms large in the history of the creation,
governance, and political economy of the modern Ethiopian state. At times,
as is well known, the Emperor Haile Selassie depended on his armies to
retain and extend his powers. One of his great achievements in
modernizing the government and constitutional order was the development
of a large, well-trained, professionalized military establishment, but the
size of the army coupled with its autonomy from civil government and
society seemed to lay the foundations for military intervention as the
Emperor's power inevitably waned.
58 See id. art. VIII.
9 See id. art. X(c).
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Under the constitutions of 1931 and 1955,6o the Emperor commanded
the armed forces and the police, and he retained exclusive executive
powers to determine their size, organization, and cost; to establish the law
governing their leadership and discipline; to decree emergency powers and
martial law; and to deploy security forces, as he deemed necessary, to
assure the integrity of the Empire. These powers were elaborated by
various executive and legislative instruments promulgated over the years,
though much of the detailed law governing the security forces seems
obscure and unrevealed to the public. This body of law can be
characterized in general terms as follows:
1. Centralized Executive Control exercised directly by the Emperor or
by ministers and officers who, in turn, were appointed and dismissed by
him;
2. Autonomy, in the sense that, subject to the control of the Emperor,
the security forces were left free to govern themselves in accordance with
their own regulations;
3. Lack of Accountability to Civil Society, in the sense that governance
of both the police and the army were, for all effective purposes, beyond
60 The Constitution of 1931 (Ethiopia's first written constitution) is reprinted in I
ETHIOPIAN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT: A SOURCEBOOK 326 (James C.N. Paul &
Christopher Clapham eds., 1967), along with an unpublished commentary. Id. at 331. See
Articles 11-13, reserving the Emperor's prerogative to command the armed forces,
determine their size, and appoint and dismiss all officers. Id. The Revised Constitution of
1955 is reprinted in id. at 1. For provisions in the Constitution of 1955 that are similar
to those in the 1931 Constitution, see Article 27 (The Emperor "determines the
organization, powers and duties of all Ministries . . . and appoints, promotes . . . and
dismisses officials of the same."); Article 29 (It is the Emperor's prerogative to declare
war, "to decide what armed forces shall be maintained"[;] to act as "Commander-in-
Chief'[;] to "organize" armed forces; to "confer military rank" on all officers; to
"declare a state of siege, martial law or a national emergency"[;] and to. take "such
measures as are necessary to meet a threat to the defense or integrity of the Empire.").
See also 2 ETHIOPIAN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT: A SOURCEBOOK 498-505 (James
C.N. Paul & Christopher Clapham eds., 1971) (commentary on these powers).
While neither constitution treats explicitly with the police, it would appear that these
forces are equated with the armed forces for the purpose of determining constitutional
powers to organize and control them. See Proclamation No. 6, supra note 26, for the
"Proclamation" (actually an executive order) establishing the police. See also A
Proclamation to Provide for the Establishment and Government of a Force Styled the
Imperial Army, Proclamation No. 68, NEGARITGAZETA, Mar. 11, 1944 (Eth.) (establishing
the Imperial Army and creating military law governing army); Imperial Territorial Army
Order, Order No. 21, NEGARIT GAZETA, Feb. 18, 1958 (Eth.) (creating the "Territorial
Army" under the Ministry of Interior).
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the reach of Parliament, and that these forces were also able to evade, or
simply ignore, with impunity the orders of courts and enjoyed considerable
de facto (if not de jure) immunity from the civil law;6
4. The Absence of Law, in the sense that rules requiring respect for
human rights, obedience to the rule of law, and the constitution hardly
figured in either the professional codes governing the security forces, or
in the training and accountability of the security forces.
Experience in many countries suggests that this kind of legal
structuring-the combination of the above characteristics-helps to create
conditions within the security forces that lead not only to military
intervention when the government of the day weakens, but to military
rule-sustained military rule based on force-which can easily lead to
systematic repression, and then to all the other abuses that ultimately
attend rule by force of arms.
Centralized executive control, coupled with autonomy from the
legislature and civil society, means that the security forces can become
increasingly politicized if and when the leadership of the chief executive
falters or becomes controversial and disputed. In this situation, loyalties
tend to become divided; conspiracies emerge. In the face of political
uncertainty, and when the army enjoys autonomy, the temptation to seize
government and control its resources with little accountability becomes
strong.
Legal autonomy for the security forces often breeds a sense of social
autonomy and political separateness. The very fact that members of the
security forces live, to some extent at least, in a distinct society of their
own, isolated from the civil society they are supposed to police, creates
risks of potentially hostile relationships between them and the public.
These risks increase when the suppression of political discontent becomes
a major internal security concern, when accountability to the public for the
exercise of security powers is diminished, and when leaders of the security
forces come to believe that civil society is infested with political and
professional elites and others who become ideologically suspect when they
appear to be hostile to the regime in power. Thus, professionals,
intellectuals, students, and other particular groups, including ethnic groups,
come to be seen by the security forces as potential enemies to be watched
carefully, repressed by overt force, and controlled by terror, if necessary.
The legitimacy of this kind of force against fellow citizens is more readily
assumed by soldiers and police when their training and leaders appear to
61 See supra note 60.
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condone it, and when the powers of civil society and the legal system to
protest abuses and control the police and military are weak.62
Systematic use of force, particularly in the context of a large,
pluralistic country, may breed recourse to force as the only apparent means
of opposition to an authoritarian regime. Recourse to the politics of
violence and civil warfare-arguably a venerable theme of Ethiopian
history-became, perhaps, an inevitable response to the brutal rule of the
Derg. But this kind of civil warfare perhaps has generated divisions within
society which now threaten the unity of the state. The tasks of restoring
not simply order, but confidence in, and support for, the new constitutional
order may depend in part on the legitimacy accorded to the future security
forces in the processes of transition.
The need to reconstitute the security forces has been recognized by the
TGE as a task of central importance-important because, defacto, the TGE
is itself a military regime even though it struggles to escape that
contradiction by operating de jure under the transitional constitution, the
Charter, as a civilian government.63
The army's leadership is also said to operate as an 9minence grise in
the non-transparent, ruling circles of both the ruling party, the EPDRF, and
the Government. This apparent politicization of the army, whether fact or
simply apparent fact, surely undermined the credibility and legitimacy of
the role that it played in disarming the paramilitary units of other "libera-
tion front" parties in earlier stages of the transition, in policing elections
of the regional governments in 1992, and in the sometimes violent way it
has put down other disturbances.' It could undermine the role that the
army may have to play in securing the integrity of future elections.
62 On these phenomena, see, e.g., JEROME H. SKOLNICK & JAMES J. FYFE, ABOVE THE
LAW: POLICE AND THE EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE 89-171 (1993); see also ROBIN
LUCKHAM, THE NIGERIAN MILITARY: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF AUTHORITY &
REVOLT 161-67 (1971).
63 Proclamation No. 8 of 1991 provided that "the Army of the EPDRF shall serve as
the State Defense Army for the Transition Period," A Proclamation to Provide for the
Deployment of the State Defense Army of the Central Transitional Government and for
the Establishment of Police Force, Proclamation No. 8, NEGARIT GAZETA, art. 3(1), Jan.
16, 1992 (Eth.) [hereinafter Proclamation No. 8], and vested it with broad power to
"bring under control any major subversion" threatening the TGE. Id. art. 3(2). It further
provided for the establishment of regional police forces under the supervision of the TGE,
which also established its own police force. Proclamation No. 9 of 1991 provided for the
encampment and demobilization of the armed forces of other political organizations (e.g.
the OLF). A Proclamation to Provide for the Creation of Expeditious Conditions for the
Election of National/Regional Self-Governments, Proclamation No. 9, NEGARIT GAZETA,
Jan. 27, 1992 (Eth.).
6' See, e.g., Africa Watch, Ethiopia: Waiting for Justice-Shortcomings in Establishing
the Rule of Law (May 8, 1992).
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Moreover, the TGE's army is hardly a national one in demographic terms,
and, obviously, the attempt to police the entire country by an army largely
composed of a minority ethnic group is fraught with risks. Further, there
still appears to be, at present, little law governing the control, finance,
operations, and accountability of this security force to civil society.65
These concerns are reflected in a candid, thoughtful paper apparently
prepared under the aegis of the Ministry of Defense for the February 1993
Bujumbura Conference, "Democratization in Africa: The Role of the
Military. ' 66 The paper makes the following points: (1) in a democracy,
civil society must enjoy an ultimate power to govern the army; (2) the
army must be a truly national army composed of people from all regions
and ethnic groups, so that all elements of the population will see it as
"their" army; (3) insofar as the army engages in local, internal security
operations, it should enlist the participation of affected people in concerned
communities in devising appropriate strategies to protect them; (4) the
army must be completely separated and disengaged from politics and
political parties; (5) the army must be under the control of, and
accountable to, the civil organs of government; and (6) the overriding
mission of the army must be to sustain the country's constitution, and its
loyalties must be rooted in that objective.67
These points take on particular force when considered in the context
of the transition yet to come in Ethiopia. Obviously, the promulgation of
a new constitutional order will not, by itself, produce the aspired goals. In
realistic terms, a transition must be seen as a long, difficult period. Quite
61 See Tsadkan Gebre Tensae, The Unique Experience of Army-Building in Ethiopia
4 (Feb. 1, 1993). This paper was presented to the February 1993 Bujumbura Conference,
"Democratization in Africa: The Role of the Military," by Tsadkan Gebre Tensae, Chief
of Staff of the Armed Forces of Ethiopia. The Transitional Charter is silent on the
organization and governance of the security forces for the TGE. While the Council of
Representatives of the TGE has enacted laws calling for the encampment and
demobilization of the military forces of other "liberation fronts," notably the OLF, and
for the ultimate reorganization of the security forces of the TGE and its successor, this
legislation is silent on the organization and governance of this future army. See
Proclamation No. 8, supra note 63.
66 Tsadkan, supra note 65. This paper was revised and presented as Tsadkan Gebre
Tensae, "A Vision of a New Army for Ethiopia," at the InterAfrica Group's
Symposium on the Making of the New Ethiopia Constitution in Addis Ababa on May 17-
21, 1993.
67 See Tsadkan, supra note 65, at 8 ("I would like to stress the point that the
relationship between the constitution and the military must be defined on the basis of clear
principles."). General Tsadkan's views are striking in that, as far as I know, few military
leaders in Sub-Saharan Africa have been so outspoken and explicit in setting out
principles governing the constitutional position of the armed forces in a country
undertaking establishment of a democratic system.
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possibly, the introduction of democracy and competitive politics will also
introduce a time fraught with possibilities of rather unprincipled political
conflict, wrongdoing by party zealots, and abuse of rights in contested
elections-civil disorders that blight the prospects of democracy. The
restructuring of Ethiopia's economy, even if governed by humane policies,
may lead to severe hardships imposed on workers and to the risks of
violence from strikes and demonstrations. The introduction of freedom
coupled with severe economic hardships may create new problems of
crime and banditry. The creation of ethnic federalism may generate
manifestations of xenophobic ethnic politics and attempts by dissident
groups to create unrest and to resort to the politics of violence in some
regions. The migrations of peoples from one area to another, mostly
southward, may increase as inevitable population growth and pressures on
land force this event and create attendant needs for governments to find
ways to adjust to it and address the obvious risks of new forms of ethnic
conflict. Finally, there is, unfortunately, the inevitable risk that, at some
future point, the regime of the day may subtly seek to convert the security
forces into an instrument to maintain its political ascendancy.
These and perhaps other undesired scenarios must surely be anticipated
in planning the reconstitution of the state, including its security forces.
These challenges create the need and opportunity to develop new models
for the organization and governance of the security force, creating a vision
of police and soldiers better trained and disciplined to deal with
foreseeable emergencies while retaining public confidence in their
commitment to democracy and human rights. Indeed, if the security forces
cannot preserve order through methods that are seen by the public to be
fair and lawful, if they use the abusive and brutal methods of the past, they
may easily contribute to the subversion of democracy by undermining
popular faith in the possibilities and utility of the goals proclaimed by the
constitution.
In this context, then, the need may be urgent for security forces
acculturated and trained to show scrupulous respect for human rights and
the rule of law while performing the difficult security tasks which may
confront them. Training to respect human rights means learning new
techniques in crowd control that reflect forbearance and strict limitations
on the use of force, particularly excessive retaliatory force. So, too, there
may be the need for recruitment policies designed to secure the effective
integration of different groups into cohesive, disciplined units, including
the integration of women into all ranks. It is doubtful that these and similar
objectives can be realized in the absence of law mandating them. The very
existence of such law empowers civil society to demand its effective
implementation.
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In a broader context, confidence in the possibilities of democracy can
be strengthened, perhaps greatly, to the extent that there is a public belief
that those entrusted with weapons and powers to use them can be held
accountable to civil society through the legislature, the courts, the press,
and other processes of political participation. As the TPLF's 68 own civil
war experience in Tigray demonstrates, techniques can be devised to
facilitate dialogue between the army and the communities it polices over
local security concerns. So, too, there can be dialogue with the public at
large over security concerns. This fundamental orientation, when clearly
mandated by the law, may help to deter the efforts of power-hungry
politicians to seize or exercise illegal powers, or the efforts of others to
resort to the politics of violence.69
III. STRATEGIES FOR DEVELOPING AND IMPLEMENTING THE PRINCIPLES
Obviously, it is not enough to formulate general principles concerned
with the governance of security forces. The principles must be translated
into specific legislative provisions, and they must be reinforced and
implemented by detailed regulations. Further, this "law in the books"
must be given visibility and public support; it must become known and
respected. Achieving these goals is a formidable task, and it is one which,
in part, must be addressed by those responsible for preparing the new
constitutional order.
Several suggested strategies for realizing these goals are briefly
outlined. They are directed toward:
1. The processes employed to develop public participation in the
making of the new constitutional order. It repeatedly has been suggested
that the new constitutional order must reflect a popular consensus de-
veloped through extensive public participation in its making. The principles
embodied in the International Bill of Human Rights calling for
"self-determination" and a legal order based on "the will of the
people"7" require this kind of participation. Indeed, if the new constitution
is to be promulgated in the name of the people of Ethiopia, an emphasis
on the processes used to create it may be just as important as the work of
drafting the final product.
One way to enlist participation is to encourage full discussion
of widely shared public grievances concerned with past and present modes
68 See Tsadkan, supra note 66.
61 See id. at 7 (presenting strategies to "create an army which belongs to the
people").
70 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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of governance-grievances to be redressed by the new constitutional order.
The very process of addressing historic grievances may help to create a
popular understanding that the new constitutional order can be seen as a
resource for the people; as something that they can use to define, defend,
and promote widely shared social interests; as a law empowering the
people to demand protections against recurrence of the abuses of the past.
Certainly, the historic behavior and role of the security forces in
governance is a subject that may provide a fertile source of popular
grievances, of shared public concerns to be addressed. In the same way,
discussion of new ways to organize, govern, and impose accountability on
the security forces may be a matter of great interest to ordinary people.
Since the Constitutional Commission is obligated to develop public
discussion over its project, perhaps it should put the problems of
reconstituting the security forces high on the agenda of issues to be raised
in these discussions.
2. The processes employed to reorganize, reorient, and retrain the
security forces. Over the past year in Ethiopia, there have been several
conferences and seminars focussing on the need to provide "human rights
education" for governmental and nongovernmental groups. Indeed,
"human rights education" has become a popular international activity to
be promoted by the United Nations and other agencies.
It may be doubtful, however, that "human rights education" in the
abstract produces much meaningful effect on human behavior. If the
purpose of this education is to change behavior and cultures in the police
and the military, the education attempted must be fully integrated with the
rules of conduct and the customs that actually govern the security forces,
and with the systems of discipline and accountability that are employed to
enforce those rules. The central purpose of this training must be to secure
both respect for and obedience to commands of the law that governs them.
Training and discipline-education and the creation of new values and
loyalties-must all be seen as interrelated, interdependent means and ends
to enforce the law.
All this underscores the importance of mandating not only codes of
conduct and discipline grounded in human rights law to govern all ranks
of the security forces, but mandating a system of education, training, and
retraining designed to give effect to the codes. The principles prescribed
by the Constitutional Commission can call for this result.
3. Techniques that the Constitutional Commission can use to elaborate
principles that will put the security forces under the Rule of Law. The
essential purpose of this paper is to urge that attention be given to the need
for principles controlling the governance of the security forces to be estab-
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lished in a reconstituted Ethiopian state. The details and content of these
principles may be a matter for debate, but the need to address this task, as
part of the process of constitution-making, seems compelling. These prin-
ciples will be more intelligible, easier for people to grasp and debate, than
a "long-form" document, which can easily become like a complex code
requiring extended study-and considerable literacy-for comprehension.
While a "short-form" constitution may be desirable, a democratic
order and the full protection of rights and the effective rule of law can
only be established if the constitution is implemented, and its principles
reinforced, by various bodies of legislation elaborating its different
provisions. In the absence of these bodies of law, the constitutional order
will be incomplete and flawed with ambiguity. So, too, the work of the
Commission might itself be regarded as incomplete and flawed if it failed
to elaborate the content of the constitutional order envisioned by the
constitution proposed.
The Commission cannot, of course, prepare drafts of all the legislation
needed to create the new constitutional order envisioned, but it can provide
directions and guidance for that purpose. This guidance might take the
form of a report describing the work needed to complete the constitutional
order. Alternatively, guidance could be provided, and action mandated, by
appending to the constitution a body of "directive principles" that call
upon the future government to adopt legislation addressing subjects of
major, enduring concern and that set out basic principles to be secured
through that legislation.
Directive principles have been incorporated in some constitutions in a
form that gives them an effect similar to a preamble. In this approach, the
directive principles are cast in the form of abstract, aspirational goals of
social justice to which the state is pledged. These kinds of directive
principles are often treated as "soft" law in the sense that, unlike other
constitutional prescriptions, they are regarded as unenforceable by the
courts and often are written in such general terms that they carry an
uncertain meaning, thus little legal effect.
Another way to use directive principles is to cast them in the form of
specific commands to the future government to enact legislation on
designated subjects that will incorporate certain principles deemed crucial
to the ongoing development of the future constitutional order. In this
approach, the directive principles provide an important framework for the
further development of the constitutional order, a set of imperative
directions for the ongoing evolution of essential institutions, processes, and
principles of governance. Further, the courts can be empowered to use
these principles for guidance in constitutional interpretation.
Directive principles of this character have the virtue of providing a
proposed map depicting steps necessary to complete the transition. They
[Vol. 3:1
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also provide a text that can be used by public leaders and activists in the
ongoing processes of developing that kind of popular civic education and
political participation that may be essential to sustain the transition over
time.
The appended Draft Code was prepared on the assumption that the
principles of the kind prescribed by it are mandated by international human
rights law. Experience the world over surely suggests we should no longer
tolerate unregulated police or armies as semiautonomous organs of
government. Putting the army and the 'police under a rule of law may be
a task of the highest priority to those committed to the cause of building
human rights and democracy.
APPENDIX
DRAFT CODE OF UNIVERSAL PRINCIPLES TO
GOVERN THE STRUCTURE AND
ACCOUNTABILITY OF INTERNAL SECURITY
FORCES OPERATING IN ALL STATES
Introductory Note
This proposed code and the annotations to it have been prepared by
Elizabeth Marshall and Lori Weiner, former students of the Rutgers
University Law School at Newark, under the general supervision of James
Paul, William J. Brennan Professor of Law at Rutgers University.
The proposed Code sets out a body of principles to govern the legal
structure of the police and all other organizations, including military units,
that regularly exercise police powers to protect the internal security of a
country. These principles are drawn from sources of international human
rights law and are intended to reflect universal norms that should be
followed in all countries committed to the establishment and maintenance
of a democratic constitutional order, protection of widely recognized
international human rights, and the rule of law.
The fundamental premise of the Code is that international human rights
law mandates the creation of governmental organs that will promote and
protect internationally recognized human rights, not subvert them, and that
all organs of government must be legally structured so as to assure this
objective insofar as possible. Since the police and other internal security
forces (ISFs) are such important organs of government, exercising powers
that, if abused, so obviously may lead to serious subversions of human
rights, particular care must be taken in drafting constitutional and
legislative provisions and subsidiary legislation-rules and regulations-that
create, organize, and empower an ISF and provide for its governance and
accountability to the rule of human rights law and to civil society.
The Code is hardly a novel enterprise. The United Nations Code of
Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials was intended by the U.N. General
Assembly, without dissent, to have universal applicability. That Code of
Conduct, combined with other international human rights instruments
adopted within the United Nations system, shows us how ISFs must be
structured to make them accountable to the goals sought. This proposed
Code is simply intended to synthesize these existing mandates.
This Code is simply a draft. The principles stated are suggestions. The
purpose is to promote wider interest and debate over the need for a body
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of universal principles of the character of those proposed here to be
developed as an important additional body of international human rights
law.
Article I. The Nature, Purposes, and Scope of this Code
a) The Principles set out in this Code:
1) are derived from existing International Human Rights law;
2) are designed to assure that all Internal Security Forces (as that
term is defined below) of all states will be established in
accordance with, governed by, and held accountable to rules of
law that secure the protection of universally recognized human
rights;
3) should be incorporated into the constitutions and/or other laws
that create, organize, empower, and otherwise provide for the
existence of all ISFs established by the State or by any of its
subsidiary organs.
b) The term Internal Security Forces (ISFs) as used in this Code
refers to all police, military, intelligence gathering, custodial, and
other organizations that are authorized to exercise any of the
following police powers:
1) arrest or detention of persons (including emergency powers of
detention);
2) surveillance of persons or premises, or search for or seizure of
evidence from persons or premises;
3) interrogation of people in order to secure evidence;
4) custodial functions, such as the administration of prisons or
places of detention and the guarding or care of prisoners.
Commentary
ISFs are established to protect the constitutional order of the state and
the rights of its people. They are not created to maintain the regime of the
day in power or to advance its interests.
The principles enumerated herein should be incorporated into the laws
relating to the establishment and governance of ISFs so as to make them
accountable to the people at all times and to reinforce the obligations of
all ISF personnel to protect the rule of law and human rights.
The definition of ISF organizations in this Code is purposely made
broad enough to include military organizations that are regularly used to
maintain internal security by exercising police powers as defined above.
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Sources
United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights,' art. 28.
"Law enforcement officials shall at all times fulfill the duty imposed
upon them by law, by serving the community and by protecting all persons
against illegal acts, consistent with the high degree of responsibility
required by their profession." United Nations Code of Conduct for Law
Enforcement Officials,2 art. 1.
"(a) The term 'law enforcement officials' includes all officers of the
law, whether appointed or elected, who exercise police powers, especially
the powers of arrest or detention. (b) In countries where police powers are
exercised by military authorities, whether uniformed or not, or by state
security forces, the definition of law enforcement officials shall be
regarded as including officers of such services." Code of Conductfor Law
Enforcement Officials, supra note 2, art. 1, cmts. (a), (b).
"The armed forces owe respect to the political order determined by
the sovereign will of the people and all political or social changes
generated by that will, in accordance with democratic procedures consistent
with the Constitution." Peace Agreement Between the Government of El
Salvador and the Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberaci6n Nacional,3
ch. I(1)(C).
"[The National Civil Police's] mission shall be to protect and
safeguard the free exercise of the rights and freedoms of individuals, to
prevent and combat all types of crimes, and to maintain internal peace,
tranquility, order and public security in both urban and rural areas." Peace
Agreement, supra note 3, ch. II(1)(A).
Article II. Source of Organic Legislation Establishing and
Empowering ISF Organizations
a) Organic legislation. The law establishing and setting forth the
functions and powers of every ISF organization (or expanding its
functions and powers) should be:
G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., pt. 1, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/180 (1948)
[hereinafter Universal Declaration of Human Rights].
2 G.A. Res. 169, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. A/34/169 (1979);
reprinted in 18 UN RESOL. 185 (Dusan J. Djonovich ed., 1985) [hereinafter Code of
Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials].
' The Situation in Central America: Threats to International Peace and Security and
Peace Initiatives, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 31, at 1, U.N. Doc.
A/46/864 (1992) [hereinafter Peace Agreement].
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1) enacted by the representative, elected legislative organ of the
Government, and never by decree promulgated by the executive
organ without the advice and consent of the legislative body;
2) the product of political participation, including processes
enabling transparency and public debate;
3) consonant with the principles of universal human rights law
and the provisions of this Code.
b) Subsidiary legislation. Rules, regulations, and all other subsidiary
legislation promulgated by the Executive Branch (or by the Chief
Officer of an ISF) pertaining to the organization, empowerment,
governance, and monitoring of an ISF should be:
1) published in the official, government journal -that records
legislation;
2) made subject to legislative review; and
3) clearly consistent with the ISF's organic legislation and with
this Code.
Commentary
In order to achieve the goals of this Code, it is important to establish
and enforce a complete legal structure for each ISF that is consistent with
the principles of this Code. It is important that the laws empowering ISFs
incorporate the existing provisions of human rights law regarding
surveillance, search, arrest, detention, imprisonment, the use of force, and
other rights limiting the exercise of police powers. Often, the organic laws
that create and govern ISFs are not the product of participation and debate.
Requiring these laws to be enacted through an open democratic process
will help to eliminate the granting of broad and ambiguous powers and
will give a government and civil society committed to human rights a
greater ability to control ISFs. The legislative review process should
include public hearings so as to enhance the ability to revise rules
governing an ISF, when appropriate in light of experience.
Sources
"Everyone is entitled to a social . . . order in which the rights and
freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized." Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 1, art. 28.
"(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his
country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.... (3) The will
of the people shall be the basis of the authority of the government." Id.
art. 21. Similar provisions appear in the International Covenant on Civil
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and Political Rights,4 art. 25(a); African Charter on Human and Peoples'
Rights,5 art. 13; American Convention on Human Rights,6 art. 23.
"[E]ach State Party . . . undertakes to take the necessary steps, in
accordance with its constitutional processes and with the provisions of the
present Covenant, to adopt such legislative or other measures as may be
necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant."
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 4, art.
2(2). Similar provisions appear in American Convention on Human Rights,
supra note 6, art. 2; African Charter for Human and Peoples' Rights,
supra note 5, art. 1.
"(b) ... [T]he effective maintenance of ethical standards among law
enforcement officials depends, on the existence of a well-conceived,
popularly accepted and humane system of laws .... ." Code of Conduct
for Law Enforcement Officials, supra note 2, pmbl.
Article III. Principles Governing Control of ISFs by the Basic
Organs of Government
a) Executive Control. Ultimate executive authority over all ISF
organizations should be vested in a civil officer who is immediately
accountable to the head of government. This civilian officer should
have the power to appoint, remove, and order the discipline of all
officials of whatever rank within ISF organizations, and such
powers should be subject to the oversight of the executive head of
government, so that he or she can be held accountable for
systematic failures to comply with the Code.
b) Legislative Control. The elected representative legislative body
should be vested with power to:
1) determine the size, functions, powers, and organization of all
ISFs;
2) enact a budget and appropriate funds for their equipment and
operations;
3) exercise financial oversight over their activities;
4) investigate their activities in order to determine whether they
are operating in accordance with the principles set out in this
Code.
4 G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966), reprinted in 6 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 368 (1967).
'O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev.5 (1981), reprinted in 21 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS
58 (1982).
6 O.A.S. Off. Rec. OER/Ser. L/V/II.23/Doc. 21/Rev. 6 (1979).
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c) Judicial Control. Courts should be vested with all judicial powers
necessary to assure that all principals set out in this Code are
followed.
Commentary
Each branch of government should have powers of oversight and
control over ISF organizations consistent with its essential constitutional
role. By establishing a clear chain of command over ISFs, their operations
will be less able to avoid accountability for wrongdoing. Continuing
legislative oversight is necessary and appropriate because the legislature
represents the voice of the people, who provide both the funds and
authority for all organs of government in a democratic state committed to
the protection of human rights. Thus, the ISFs remain responsive to the.
people they are supposed to protect.
Sources
"States . . . should enact and enforce, if necessary, legislation
proscribing acts that constitute serious abuses of political or economic
power, as well as promoting policies and mechanisms for the prevention
of such acts, and should develop and make readily available appropriate
rights and remedies for victims of such acts." Declaration of Basic
Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power,7 art.
21.
"(a) ... [E]very law enforcement agency should be representative of
and responsive and accountable to the community as a whole .... (d)...
[T]he actions of law enforcement officials should be responsive to public
scrutiny . . . ." Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, supra
note 2, pmbl.
Article IV. Enactment of a Code of Conduct as Part of the Law
Governing All ISFs
a) The legislative body should enact a Code of Conduct governing the
internal operations of all ISF organizations and prescribing the
conduct of each individual ISF member.
1) The obligations and restrictions set forth in the Code of
Conduct should be clear and specific, so that all ISF personnel
are aware of the limits on their power.
G.A. Res. 40/34, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. No. 53, at 213, U.N. Doc. A/40/53
(1985), reprinted in 24 UN RESOL. 419 (Dusan J. Djonovich ed., 1988).
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2) The Code of Conduct should incorporate all relevant human
rights standards and impose clear duties to assure adherence to
these standards and protection of the rights prescribed.
3) The Code of Conduct should provide for internal discipline and
punishment of violators of those rights.
A) Internal sanctions imposed under the Code of Conduct
should reflect the gravity of the offense and should be
publicized both within and without the ISF organization, so
as to maximize the deterrent effect.
B) Such sanctions should never preclude civil or criminal
liability in the courts, when necessary in order to vindicate
and redress the rights of persons injured by violations of
the Code.
4) No ISF official should be disciplined, either officially or
unofficially, for refusing to follow an order that he or she
reasonably believes would lead to a violation of the Code of
Conduct or to a violation of human rights protected by the laws
of the land.
b) Members of ISFs should have a duty under the Code of Conduct
to report violations of the Code or violations of any other law
applicable to the ISF, to superior officers and, if necessary, to
responsible civil officers of the government and to persons charged
with ISF oversight.
1) Failure to report known violations should be grounds for
punishment under the Code of Conduct.
2) The duty to report should transcend all other obligations
grounded in loyalty and discipline.
3) No ISF official should be disciplined, either officially or
unofficially, for good faith attempts to discharge the duties
imposed by this Article and the Code of Conduct.
c) The civil officer with ultimate authority over an ISF should take
appropriate steps to assure that the Code of Conduct will be
understood and strictly enforced at all levels within the organiza-
tion.
Commentary
Without a Code of Conduct governing the internal operations of ISF
organizations, ISF members are left unrestrained and unguided in their
enforcement of the laws. A Code of Conduct that sets forth the steps
necessary to enforce rules that recognize, protect, and reinforce basic
human rights and that explains the consequences for violations of these
rights is necessary to provide guidance for all ISF personnel. The Code of
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Conduct governing ISF members should incorporate all relevant human
rights law regarding surveillance, search, arrest, detention, imprisonment,
the use of force, and other rights limiting the exercise of police powers.
The requirement of reporting human rights violations emphasizes the
overriding importance of protecting human rights as a paramount duty of
all law enforcement officials. It must be recognized that the observance of
basic human rights and the maintenance of the rule of law transcends
norms commanding loyalty to the ISF. In furtherance of this, an official
who reports such violations by fellow officials cannot be punished for
doing so, whether by losing his job; not being promoted; being assigned
only to less desirable, menial duties; or in any other way designed to
penalize him or her.
Sources
"[E]very law enforcement agency, in fulfillment of the first premise
of every profession, should be held to the duty of disciplining itself in
complete conformity with the principles and standards herein provided."
Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, supra note 2, pmbl., cmt.(d).,
"Law enforcement officials shall respect the law and the present Code.
They shall also to the best of their capability, prevent and rigorously
oppose any violations of them. Law enforcement officials who have reason
to believe that a violation of the present Code has occurred or is about to
occur shall report the matter to their superior authorities and, where
necessary, to other appropriate authorities or organs vested with reviewing
or remedial power." Id. art. 8.
"Governments shall prohibit orders from superior officers or public
authorities authorizing or inciting other people to carry out any such
extra-legal, arbitrary or summary executions. All persons shall have the
right and the duty to defy such orders. Training of law enforcement
officers shall emphasize the above provisions." Principles on the Effective
Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and Summary
Executions,8 art. 3.
Article V. Recruitment and Training
a) Recruitment. The law governing each ISF should provide:
8 E.S.C. Res. 1989/65, U.N. ESCOR, 1st Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 52, U.N. Doc.
E/1989/89 (1989) (endorsed by the General Assembly Dec. 15, 1989).
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1) that no person be barred from serving or advancing in any ISF
organization because of race, ethnicity, color, sex, religion, or
other status;
2) that procedures be initiated to encourage the equitable
representation of all racial, ethnic, and cultural groups at every
level of the ISF organization; and
3) that the full participation of women and their equal opportu-
nity to be promoted to all ranks be ensured.
b) Training. The law governing each ISF should provide:
1) that education and sensitization regarding human rights, and
the obligation of ISF personnel to respect those rights, be fully
incorporated into all relevant aspects of basic training;
2) that additional training on the human rights obligations of ISF
officials be repeated and emphasized throughout an ISF
member's period of service.
Commentary
ISF memberships often consist primarily, or solely, of male members
of a majority (or a particular) ethnic, racial, or cultural group. This fact
often tends to reinforce prejudices between ISFs and other groups and
increases the risk of discrimination in the enforcement of laws against
minorities and women. ISF organizations should strive for equality among
the different groups and genders. By recruiting members from varying
backgrounds, the ISF forces not only become ethnically mixed, but their
members should become more sensitive to the need to respect cultural,
linguistic, religious, and gender differences. This should result in more
equal enforcement of the laws and diminish abuses against minority groups
and women.
Proper training should also serve to sensitize members to the need to
respect all citizens and to reinforce human rights obligations under existing
international law.
Sources
"Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this
Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status." Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
supra note 1, art. 21(2).
"Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity ... [t]o have
access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country."
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 4, art.
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25(c). A similar provision appears in American Convention on Human
Rights, supra note 5, art. 23(1)(c).
"Each State Party undertakes to engage in no act or practice of racial
discrimination against persons, groups of persons or institutions and to
ensure that all public authorities and public institutions, national and local,
shall act in conformity with this obligation." International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,9 art. 2(1)(a).
"State Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate
discrimination against women in the political and public life of the country
and, in particular, shall ensure, on equal terms with men, the right[] ...
[t]o participate in the formulation of government policy and the
implementation thereof and to hold public office and perform all public
functions at all levels of government." Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,10 art. 7(b).
"Each State Party shall ensure that education and information
regarding prohibition against torture are fully included in the training of
law enforcement personnel, civil or military . . . and other persons who
may be involved in the custody, interrogation or treatment of any
individual subjected to any form of arrest, detention or imprisonment."
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment," art. 10(1).
"(e) . .. [S]tandards as such lack practical value unless their content
and meaning, through education and training and through monitoring,
become part of the creed for every law enforcement official." Code of
Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, supra note 2, pmbl.
"Police ... and other personnel concerned should receive training to
sensitize them to the needs of victims, and guidelines to ensure proper and
prompt aid." Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of
Crime and Abuse of Power, supra note 7, art. 16.
Article VI. Prohibition of Extra-Legal Security Forces
None of the police powers defined in Article 1(b), should be
performed by any individual who is not a member of an authorized
ISF organization.
9 G.A. Res. 2106, U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, at 47, U.N. Doc. A/6014
(1965).
"o G.A. Res. 34/180 (XXXIV), 34 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 46, at 194, U.N. Doc.
A/34/830 (1979), reprinted in 19 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 33 (1980) (adopted at New
York, Dec. 18, 1979).
" G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51
(1984), reprinted in 23 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1027 (1984).
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1) Exercise of police powers by persons other than members of an
ISF organization, created in accordance with this Code, should
be a criminal offense under State law.
2) No ISF official should be permitted to request that another
person, other than a member of an ISF, perform the functions
defined in Article 1(b). The making of such a request should be
a crime under State law, as well as grounds for internal
discipline.
3) No ISF official should be permitted to perform functions while
off-duty that he or she would be prohibited from performing
while on-duty.
Commentary
Currently there is a problem in many countries concerning "unoffi-
cial" security forces that operate outside the existing laws of the country.
Sometimes ISF officials are members of, or associated with, these
extra-legal groups; sometimes they condone and cooperate with them.
Officials must understand that the obligations to which they are bound
while working as an officer bind them when they are off duty. Any officer
caught cooperating in any way with an extra-legal security organization or
encouraging its activities should be punished.
Article VII. Duty to Keep and Release Records
a) Laws governing ISFs should:
1) mandate the keeping of complete records regarding all arrests,
detentions, interrogations, and other security activities directly
affecting the rights of particular persons;
2) require records on the internal standing orders of the ISF;
3) provide for public access to these records; and
4) provide for sanctions against responsible ISF officials for
failure to comply with these provisions.
b) Privileges protecting ISF records from public access or disclosure
should not be allowed:
1) to protect records concerning the arrest, detention, or
surveillance of any person under any circumstances;
2) to protect records concerning the internal operations and
policies of ISF organizations unless there is a bona fide concern
for national security or for the safety or protection of the basic
rights of a third party.
c) The Courts should be adequately empowered to secure enforce-
ment of this Article.
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Commentary
Security forces often are allowed to operate behind a veil of secrecy.
This protection, often enabling concealment of wrongdoing, must be
removed, and ISF organizations must be made to operate more transpar-
ently. Rules requiring certain record-keeping will assist concerned people
and relevant government officials to maintain proper oversight and keep
ISFs accountable. Privileges allowing the withholding of certain records
from the public should be few and should be only allowed where clearly
necessary to protect national security or the basic rights of persons. All
limitations to public access to these records should be narrowly construed.
Sources
"1. There shall be duly recorded: (a) The reasons for the arrest; (b)
The time of the arrest and the taking of the arrested person to a place of
custody as well as that of his first appearance before a judicial or other
authority; (c) The identity of the law enforcement officials concerned; (d)
Precise information concerning the place of custody. 2. Such records shall
be communicated to the detained person, or his counsel, if any, in the form
prescribed by law." Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons
under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment,1 2 princ. 12.
"1. The duration of any interrogation of a detained or imprisoned
person and of the intervals between interrogations as well as the identity
of the officials who conducted the interrogations and other persons present
shall be recorded and certified in such form as may be prescribed by law.
2. A detained or imprisoned person, or his counsel when provided by law,
shall have access to [this] information." Id. princ. 23.
"(1) In every place where persons are imprisoned there shall be kept
a bound registration book with numbered pages in which shall be entered
in respect of each prisoner received: (a) Information concerning his
identity; (b) the reasons for his commitment and the authority therefor; (c)
The day and hour of his admission and release. (2) No person shall be
received in an institution without a valid commitment order of which the
details shall have been previously entered in the register." Standard
Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners,13 rule 7.
"Governments shall ensure that persons deprived of their liberty are
held in officially recognized places of custody, and that accurate in-
" G.A. Res. 43/173, U.N. GAOR, 43d Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 297, U.N. Doc. A/43/49
(1988).
13 E.S.C. Res. 663 (XXIV) C, 24 U.N. ESCOR, Supp. No, 1, at 11, U.N. Doc. E/3048
(1957).
1994]
WILLIAM AND MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
formation on their custody and whereabouts, including transfers, is made
promptly available to their relatives and lawyer or other persons of
confidence." Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of
Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions, supra note 8, princ. 6.
Article VIII. Liability of Officials for Violation of Rights
a) The penal laws of a country should contain explicit provisions
criminalizing the clear violation of the basic human rights of
citizens by ISF officials acting under color of law.
1) Punishments imposed by a court or other tribunal should
reflect the gravity and depravity of the offense committed, the
complicity of the perpetrator, the role and culpability of the
perpetrator for the crime or crimes committed, and the need to
deter such conduct.
2) Defenses such as "superior order" should not be allowed.
3) Mitigation of sanctions can only come after determination of
guilt, and then only in accordance with criteria that reflect the
gravity of the human rights violations.
4) Amnesty or impunity should not be granted for violations
committed under predecessor governments.
5) Once the guilt of an offender has been admitted or established,
the tribunal trying him or her (or the Executive Official with
power to commute punishments) may, after a proper and full
apology and a commitment regarding the offender's future
conduct, suspend any punishment when it is determined that
this course is in the public interest and will not subvert the
basic purposes of this Article or allow a grave violation of
human rights to go unpunished.
b) The civil laws of a country should provide adequate remedies,
including the award of compensatory and punitive damages, for
victims or families of victims of human rights violations by ISF
officials.
c) The award of a civil remedy should never preclude the possibility
of criminal liability, and the imposition of criminal sanctions
should never preclude the availability of a civil remedy.
Commentary
One of the most important ways to ensure that human rights are
protected is accountability. ISF officials can only be held accountable if a
variety of civil and criminal penalties face them if they are found to
violate this Code or citizens' rights. Without a method of enforcement,
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including adequate punishment for the wrongdoer, the gravity of the
violations is lost on the ISF officials, both the wrongdoer and his or her
colleagues. Proper remedies must exist to serve as a deterrent factor for
other ISF officials. Full enforcement of human rights law is only possible
where a meaningful remedy is available to the victims of such violations.
These remedies, either criminal or civil in nature, must be available against
any and every violator of human rights or the fundamental rule of law.
Further, ISF officials should be held accountable for their own actions
and be unable to blame their misbehavior on a higher, possibly unknown,
officer by claiming "superior order."
Sources
Criminal liability: "Each State Party shall ensure that all acts of
torture are offences under its criminal law. The same shall apply to an
attempt to commit torture and to an act by any person which constitutes
complicity or participation in torture." Convention on Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, supra note 11,
art. 4(1).
"The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed
in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law
which they undertake to prevent and to punish." Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,14 art. 1.
"International criminal responsibility shall apply, irrespective of the
motive involved, to individuals, members of organizations and institutions
and representatives of the State, [committing, participating in, directly
inciting, conspiring, abetting, encouraging, or co-operating in the crime of
apartheid]." International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment
of the Crime of 'Apartheid, "15 art. III.
"Governments shall prohibit by law all extra-legal, arbitrary and
summary executions and shall ensure that any such executions are
recognized as offences under their criminal laws, and are punishable by
appropriate penalties which take into account the seriousness of such
offences." Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of
Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions, supra note 8, princ. 1.
No immunity: "Each State Party to the present Convention undertakes
• . .[t]o ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein
recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding
14 G.A. Res. 260, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., pt. 1, Annex, at 174, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948)
(adopted at New York, Dec. 9, 1948).
"5 G.A. Res. 3068 (XXVIII), 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 30, at 75, U.N. Doc. A/9030
(1974).
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that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official
capacity." International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra
note 4, art. 2(3)(a).
"Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated...
shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers,
public officials or private individuals." Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note 14, art. IV.
"The law must be enforced fully with respect to any law enforcement
official who commits an act of corruption, as Governments cannot expect
to enforce the law among their citizens if they cannot, or will not, enforce
the law against their own agents . . . ." Code of Conduct for Law
Enforcement Officials, supra note 2, art. 7, cmt. (a).
"The authorities which arrest a person, keep him under detention or
investigate the case shall exercise only the powers granted to them under
the law and the exercise of these powers shall be subject to recourse to a
judicial or other authority." Body of Principles for the Protection of All
Persons Under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, supra note 12,
princ. 9.
"Superiors, officers or other public officials may be responsible for
acts committed by officials under their authority if they had a reasonable
opportunity to prevent such acts. In no circumstances, including a state of
war, siege or other public emergency, shall blanket immunity from
prosecution be granted to any person allegedly involved in extra-legal,
arbitrary or summary executions." Principles of the Effective Prevention
and Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions,
supra note 8, princ. 19.
No Defenses: "[N]or may any law enforcement official invoke
superior orders or exceptional circumstances such as a state of war or a
threat of war, a threat to national security, internal political instability or
any other public emergency as a justification of torture or other cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."' Code of Conduct for
Law Enforcement Officials, supra note 2, art. 5.
"(2) No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war
or threat of war, internal political instability or any other public
emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture. (3) An order from
a superior officer or a public authority may not be invoked as a
justification of torture." Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, supra note 11, art. 2(2),
(3).
"Governments shall prohibit orders from superior officers or public
authorities authorizing or inciting other persons to carry out any such
extra-legal, arbitrary or summary executions. All persons shall have the
right and the duty to defy such orders. Training of law enforcement
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officers shall emphasize the above provisions." Principles on the Effective
Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and Summary
Executions, supra note 8, princ. 3.
Civil liability: "Anyone who has been the victim of unlawful arrest or
detention shall have an enforceable right to compensation." International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 4, art. 9(5).
"Where public officials or other agents acting in an official or
quasi-official capacity have violated national criminal laws, the victims
should receive restitution from the State whose officials or agents were
responsible for the harm inflicted. In cases where the Government under
whose authority the victimizing act or omission occurred is no longer in
existence, the State or Government successor in title should provide
restitution to the victims." Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for
Victims of Crimes and Abuse of Power, supra note 7, princ. 11.
"Damage incurred because of acts or omissions by a public official
contrary to the rights contained in these principles shall be compensated
according to the applicable rules on liability provided by domestic law."
Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of
Detention or Imprisonment, supra note 12, princ. 35(1).
"Each State Party shall ensure in its legal system that the victim of an
act of torture obtains redress and has an enforceable right to fair and
adequate compensation, including the means for as full rehabilitation as
possible. In the event of the death of the victim as a result of an act of
torture, his dependents shall be entitled to compensation." Convention on
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, supra note 11, art. 14(1).
"The families and dependents of victims of extra-legal, arbitrary or
summary executions shall be entitled to fair and adequate compensation
within a reasonable period of time." Principles on the Effective
Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and Summary
Executions, supra note 8, princ. 20.
Article IX. Principles Governing the Monitoring and Maintenance
of the Continuing Accountability of All ISFs by the Legislative,
Executive and Judicial Branches
a) The Legislature. Legislative oversight for regular ISF operations
should be established and continuously maintained. This oversight
should include powers to compel the production of records and the
giving of testimony before the legislative body or its committees.
The law should narrowly define and delimit privileges to withhold
evidence from the legislature.
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b) The Executive. The law should require the executive responsible
for ISF's duties of oversight and powers to take all appropriate
steps necessary to enforce these Principles. The executive
responsible for ISFs should be under a legal obligation to maintain
a close watch over daily operations.
c) The Attorney or Procurator General. The attorney or procurator
general should be vested with duties and powers to investigate and
enforce criminal sanctions for violations of this Code and all other
legislation pertaining to ISFs. This office must be empowered to
maintain independence and objectivity in the enforcement of its
duty.
d) The Courts. Courts should be vested not only with the usual powers
to hear cases and provide remedies, but with additional powers to
assure adherence to the principles of this Code. These powers
should include the power to appoint commissions to investigate
allegations of systematic abuse and other serious conditions and
practices. Courts should be able to frame appropriate remedial and
equitable orders, when appropriate; to prevent ongoing abuses; and
to compel individuals to comply with these remedial measures.
e) Internal Ombudsman. An ombudsman or other independent
official and office should be created within each ISF. This office
should maintain independence from external forces. It should serve
as a liaison between individual officials and their supervisors, other
branches of government, or the public and should be available to
receive reports of misconduct regarding ISF officials or superiors
officers and to investigate such allegations.
Commentary
All branches of government should be involved in maintaining daily
oversight of ISF activities. This system of continuing checks and balances
prevents one branch from taking over the ISF organizations and defeating
the democratic objectives of the people. Ensuring accountability on all
levels will serve to keep the ISFs in line.
The independence of supervising offices is vital to insure objective
investigation of complaints and abuses. The ombudsman, while serving as
an independent officer, also serves to allow access to ISF organizations.
Designating a single individual to speak on behalf of the ISF will eliminate
one aspect of the accountability problem-the. fact that no one ever is
available to speak about complaints.
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Sources
"States should periodically review existing legislation practices to
ensure their responsiveness to changing circumstances, should enact and
enforce, if necessary, legislation proscribing acts that constitute serious
abuses of political or economic power, as well as promoting policies and
mechanisms for the prevention of such acts and should develop and make
readily available appropriate rights and remedies for victims of such acts."
Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse
of Power, supra note 7, art. 21.
"[P]laces of detention shall be visited regularly by qualified and
experienced persons appointed by, and responsible to, a competent
authority distinct from the authority directly in charge of the administration
of the place of detention or imprisonment." Body of Principles for the
Protection of All Persons Under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment,
supra note 12, princ. 29. A similar provision appear in Standard Minimum
Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, supra note 13, rule 55.
"Each State Party shall keep under systematic review interrogation
rules, instructions, methods and practices as well as arrangements for the
custody and treatment of persons subjected to any form of arrest, detention
or imprisonment in any territory under its jurisdiction, with a view to
preventing any cases of torture." Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, supra note 11,
art. 11.
"In order to prevent extra-legal, arbitrary and summary executions,
Governments shall ensure strict control, including a clear chain of
command over all officials responsible for apprehension, arrest, detention,
custody and imprisonment, as well as those officials authorized by law to
use force and firearms." Principles on the Effective Prevention and
Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions, supra
note 8, princ. 2.
"Qualified inspectors, including medical personnel, or an equivalent
independent authority, shall conduct inspections in places of custody on a
regular basis, and be empowered to undertake unannounced inspections on
their own initiative, with full guarantees of independence in the exercise
of this function. The inspectors shall have unrestricted access to all persons
in such places of custody, as well as to all their records." Id. princ. 7.
"[States undertake t]o adopt legislative, judicial and administrative
measures to prosecute, bring to trial and punish ... , persons responsible
for, or accused of, the acts defined ... ." International Convention on the
Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of 'Apartheid, "supra note 15,
art. IV(b).
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"[T]he actions of law enforcement officials should be responsive to
public scrutiny, whether exercised by a review board, a ministry, a
procuracy, the judiciary, an ombudsman, a citizens' committee or any
combination thereof, or any other reviewing agency." Code of Conduct
for Law Enforcement Officials, supra note 2, pmbl.
"There shall be a thorough, prompt and impartial investigation of all
suspected cases of extra-legal, arbitrary and summary executions . . .
Governments shall maintain investigative offices and procedures to
undertake such inquiries." Principles on the Effective Prevention and
Investigation on Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions, supra
note 8, princ. 9.
"[States undertake t]o ensure that any person claiming such a remedy
shall have his right thereto determined by competent judicial, administra-
tive or legislative authorities, . . . and to develop the possibilities of
judicial remedy." International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
supra note 4, art. 2(3)(b).
"Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent
tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights guaranteed him by the
constitution or law." Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note
1, art. 8.
"Any form of detention or imprisonment and all measures affecting
the human rights of a person under any form of detention or imprisonment
shall be ordered by, or be subject to the effective control of, a judicial or
other authority." Body of Principles for the Protection of Persons Under
Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, supra note 12, princ. 4.
"Whenever the death or disappearance of a detained or imprisoned
person occurs during his detention or imprisonment, an inquiry into the
cause of death or disappearance shall be held by a judicial or other
authority, either on its own motion or at the instance of a member of the
family of such a person or any person who has knowledge of the case."
Id. princ. 34.
"Judicial and administrative mechanisms should be. established and
strengthened where necessary to enable victims to obtain redress through
formal or informal procedures that are expeditious, fair, inexpensive and
accessible." Declaration of Basic Principles for Victims of Crime and
Abuse of Power, supra note 7, princ. 5.
"Every person may resort to the courts to ensure respect for his legal
rights." American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man,'6 art. 18.
16 O.A.S. Off. Rec. OER/Ser.L/V/II.23/Doc.21/Rev.6 (1979), reprinted in INTER-
NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS: A COMPILATION OF TREATIES, AGREEMENTS AND
DECLARATIONS OF ESPECIAL INTEREST TO THE UNITED STATES 430.1 (Richard B. Lillich
ed., 1990).
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"Governments shall make every effort to prevent extra-legal, arbitrary
and summary executions through measures such as diplomatic intercession,
improved access of complainants to intergovernmental and judicial bodies,
and public denunciation." Principles on the Effective Prevention and
Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions, supra
note 8, princ. 8.
Article X. Principles Governing the Monitoring and Maintenance
of the Continuing Accountability by Press and the Public
a) The Press. The role of the press in monitoring ISF violations
should be protected and encouraged, and standards and processes
should be established to enable any member of the public to secure
access to official records, detainees, and responsible officials.
1) The law should establish a press privilege to protect infor-
mants.
2) The office created under Article IX(e), should serve as liaison
to the public and the press, who is available and knowledgeable
to answer questions which may arise.
b) Independent Tribunals. Human rights commissions or ombudsman
agencies should be created and adequately empowered to monitor
ISFs, investigate abuses, expose wrongdoing, refer cases for
prosecution, and propose legal and administrative reforms that
may enhance the accountability system. These commissions and its
members should be separate and independent of all other branches
of the government.
c) Public Participation and the Role of Citizen Organizations. The
law should protect and encourage the rights and power of citizens
to form organizations to monitor ISFs; to publicize citizens' rights
and ISF abuses of those rights; to represent victims of abuses
before-any investigative body; to bring class, as well as individual,
actions before the courts to prevent or secure remedies for abuses;
and to publicize grievances concerning the conduct of ISF
personnel or of the organization as a whole.
Commentary
Currently, citizens have virtually no input into how ISFs are created
and governed. ISFs thus operate without fear of public opposition or any
public control. They become insulated from the very people they are
designed to protect. The establishment of public powers over ISFs are
therefore central to long term efforts to control ISFs. In a rights-sensitive
political system, citizen groups, peoples organizations, and the press are
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integral components of the political system and constitutional order.
Educating the public in human rights is perhaps the most effective tool in
promoting observance of those rights. Together with a government that is
accountable to the people, the public can work to develop principles and
guidelines and effect changes for the internal operations of ISFs.
Sources
"In some countries, the mass media may be regarded as performing
complaint review functions . . . ." Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement
Officials, supra note 2, art. 8, cmt. (d).
"An African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights ... shall be
established within the Organization of African Unity to promote human
and peoples' rights and ensure their protection in Africa." The African
Charter on Human and Peoples 'Rights, supra note 5, art. 30; see also id.
arts. 45, 46.
"In cases in which the established investigative procedures are
inadequate because of lack of expertise or impartiality, because of the
importance of the matter or because of the apparent existence of a pattern
of abuse, and in cases where there are complaints from the family of the
victim about these inadequacies or other substantial reasons, Governments
shall pursue investigations through an independent commission of inquiry
or similar procedure. Members of such a commission shall be chosen for
their recognized impartiality, competence and independence as individuals.
In particular, they shall be independent of any institution, agency or person
that may be the subject of the inquiry." Principles on the Effective
Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and Summary
Executions, supra note 8, princ. 11.
"(a) ... [E]very law enforcement agency should be representative of
and responsive and accountable to the community as a whole .... (d)...
[T]he actions of law enforcement officials should be responsive to public
scrutiny, whether exercised by ... a citizens' committee ... or any other
reviewing agency." Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials,
supra note 2, pmbl.
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